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The Imperative of Responsibility (1979), by the German philosopher Hans Jonas, is a work that 
aspires to a re-foundation of ethics based on an analysis of the contemporary world as well as on a 
prediction about the fate of globalized humanity. Through a discussion of the fundamental concepts 
of Jonas' work, the essay shows that the central themes of his research, which are still very relevant 
today, should be addressed by moving from the ethical level to that of ontology - and social ontology 
in particular. To this end, the paper offers a definition of transgenerational action that aims to replace 
Jonas' use of prevision. The transgenerational action is here considered as a particular type of social 
action: that which enables societies to exist over time. Finally, the essay proposes an essential 
taxonomy of transgenerational actions, showing how working on this notion might lead to a 
consciously utopian and positive social model, as opposed to the deflationary one Jonas wished for. 
 
 









1. The analysis  
 
 
“"Why should I care about future generations? What have they ever done for me?" - Woody Allen 
wonders citing a famous line by Groucho Marx. This question reveals a rather widespread conviction, 
which criticizes the idea that human theory and practice should take charge of the long-term 
consequences of human actions. In other words, the concerns expressed with playful irony by Woody 
Allen are not easy to disregard: why should we take care to protect and defend someone or something 
that does not exist (future generations), and that could even never exist? We know very well that the 
protection of a right implies the existence of the right holder. If, as it seems, this is not the case, then 
all speculations going in a different direction are but theoretical games, and related practices can 
hardly expect to have any degree of normativity. The German philosopher Hans Jonas was among 
the first to reflect on these issues, drawing from here the opportunity for a re-foundation of ethics. 
 
 
The Imperative of Responsibility, published by Jonas in (1979), draws attention to temporality as a 
determining element in the understanding of the ethical and moral challenges that engage the 
contemporary world. In this sense, the book is still surprisingly relevant. In his essay, Jonas suggests 
a fairly radical paradigm shift that, before being substantial on the ethical level, intends to be effective 
on the metaphysical one. This change can be summed up in a different way to deal with temporality. 
Philosophy, in fact, has traditionally paid great attention to current events, using them as the 
foundation of ethics as well as politics. 




In essence, the present is the dominating dimension both in discourses related to being and to the 
relationship between being and ought-to-be, and in discourses of philosophical-political matrix. So, 
what Jonas calls for and outlines is the shift from an ethics committed to exploring the present 
condition and that defines the transition from being to ought-to-be while focusing on the present, to 
an ethics that, conversely, is interested in the present only to the extent that it constitutes the starting 
point of wider and more complex analyses. In this sense, the dimension of the present, as Jonas 
understands it, already implies as such the need to turn to the future. 
 
The argument used by Jonas in the pars destruens of his work is as simple as it is effective: most 
moral and ethical theories produced thus far are particularly ineffective in capturing the complexity 
of contemporary societies. This ineffectiveness is due to the implicit assumption of a metaphysical 
principle, namely the idea that both individual and public ethics have to be articulated in reference to 
the present or, at most, to a very near future. Therefore, for all these ethics (Aristotelian, Platonic, 
Stoic, but also Nietzschean)1 what matters is the possibility to determine the transition from being to 
ought-to-be for a single person or a certain society at a given moment. Jonas, quite rightly, explains 
how theoretical approaches of this type fail to deal with a given that characterizes human action, 
namely the technical dimension of homo faber, defined as the ability to modify and control the world. 
Now like never before, notes Jonas, man has developed highly refined technical knowledge that can 
be used to determine the alteration, the development and even the actual destruction of the natural 
and social world in which he lives.  
 
This dimension - configured as a development of knowledge that has generated a huge accumulation 
of power and that has undergone a powerful acceleration since the nineteenth century - can no longer 
be ignored by philosophical reflection.  
 
Therefore, the growth of knowledge not only oriented to the theoretical and contemplative sphere, 
but especially aimed at the control of the world of nature in its broadest sense (what Jonas identifies 
as the Baconian program), have led to a significant widening of the possibilities of human 
manipulation and intervention on nature. This entails a virtually very strong risk related to what man 
can do with/to nature. Profound and radical interventions could bring major changes whose 
consequences could not be perfectly controlled, both in relation to the macro and micro structure of 
the environment, and with respect to the very possibilities of preservation of the human species. These 
are important consequences both as regards the exploitation and alteration of available natural 
resources,2 and as regards the possibility of survival of the human species and the whole ecosystem. 
In a word, man's power of altering and depleting the environment that hosts him puts at serious risk 
the future preservation of the human species and of nature itself, by man's very hand. 
 
This, for Jonas, is the crucial issue requiring that we take charge of the future; or, rather, requiring a 
rethinking of ethics, by taking into account a fact that traditional ethical systems were unaware of 
because the knowledge-power pair had not yet appeared in all its peremptoriness. The fact of the 
matter is that the construction of our present (i.e. our choices in the economic, political and social 
fields), by virtue of the ability to widely manipulate the structures of the world, can cogently and 
permanently determine the lives of future generations. This essentially means two things: first, that 
                                                 
1 Cf. (Jonas 1979, Eng. tr. p. 87). 
2 On this topic, cf. the now classic essay by (Hardin 1968), who considers the issue of the exploitation of natural resources 
in relation to the total increase of the population. 
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our choices or the choices made by current generations are able to determine like never before the 
existence of future generations and that, therefore, this can heavily determine the very possibility of 
a future for those who will come after us. Secondly, this also means that the future must be taken very 
seriously both at a theoretical and at a normative level, with the understanding that it is an 
indispensable part for the formation of the historical judgment. In essence, given a certain action 
performed in a t-t1 period of time by a subject or a plurality of subjects, we can judge whether it is a 
right or wrong action only by considering the consequences that are derived from that action.  
 
So on the basis of a factual analysis of the characteristics and the potential of the human species, 
Jonas develops the idea that humankind should take charge in advance of what it could do, as well as 
of what it does. That is to say, given that humans have accumulated enough knowledge and power to 
be capable of destroying themselves and nature, it is necessary that they behave as if this possibility 
were the most probable. Hence the idea that the responsibility for their future, and for the possible 
consequences of their actions, should be the central idea around which to build our idea of the world. 
However, Woody Allen’s ironic question is still to be answered, along with another interrogative: it 
is not just about why we should take care of a future that isn’t our own, but also about whom we 
should do it for. That is, who are those beings whose existence we should somehow take care of 
beforehand? Jonas' answer, again, is quite simple: the newborns, who by definition require that 
someone other than them take total one-way responsibility for their lives and their future. 
 
Summing up, the fundamental concepts of Jonas’ system are the following: 
 
- the pair knowledge-power, which forms the essential theoretical core underlying his socio-
philosophical analysis;  
- the concept of future, which becomes a fundamental element of his ontology;  
- the concept of prediction, on whose proactive use he partly grounds his socio-philosophical 
analysis;  
- the idea of newborn as the first object of responsibility. If the concept of future generation is 
abstract, something possible but not really necessary, based on which it would be difficult to 
find reasons to establish some kind of normative ethics, the newborn is an already present 
being that with its very presence, and depending on the simple primitive bond with its parents, 
requires an absolute and total responsibility.  
 
Strategically, therefore, Jonas chooses to make two specific moves: in the first place not to make use 
of the concept of "future generation", which should definitely be investigated and better defined under 
the ontological profile, and secondly to give ample space to the method of prediction. The predictive 
power that humans have certainly refined through the use of mathematical modeling is taken as a 
methodological criterion, something that many sciences have already done (think of economic 
science).3 In this context, the object of protection of the rights and responsibilities is a present subject 
(the newborn), and the ability to make predictions indicates that power will be used for predominantly 
speculative and individualistic purposes. So Jonas draws the conclusion that a re-foundation of ethics 
is a necessary measure in the light of an observation (about the knowledge/power pair) and of a 
methodological principle (a good theory must account for the worst case scenario, in this case the 
self-destruction of humankind). Mutatis mutandis, this was Descartes’ idea (2012) when he 
                                                 
3 Cf. (Guala 2005, 80-83). 
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introduced the hypothesis of a malin genie in the hyperbolic doubt, and it was also Nietzsche’s idea 




2. The solutions 
 
In this framework - which is the outcome of an analysis and a predictive reasoning - the concept of 
"responsibility" became the pillar on which rests the whole of Jonas' construction. The enormous 
technological knowledge that man has been able to develop and that put him in a position to have the 
power to influence the whole of nature as well as his own species demands that he takes responsibility 
for the future. What does this mean, concretely? 
 
First, it means that an individual, as well as a society, the institutions that the latter expresses and the 
normativity that it produces should give special consideration to this fact: every single action, as well 
as every particular or collective determination, can have extremely important consequences, up to 
promoting or, conversely, preventing the continuation of life on our planet. Jonas is particularly 
radical on this point: we are not just talking about quality of life, meaning that human beings can 
worsen their condition. We are talking about the fact that human life might be annihilated, together 
with the life of other animals species. In other words, nothingness might prevail over being: “The 
option [...] of mankind's disappearing [...] touches upon the question of the obligatory being of ‘Man’, 
and this necessarily leads us back to the question of whether there should be anything at all rather 
than nothing” (Jonas 1979, Eng. tr. 47). 
 
Jonas’ position is that one has to choose being over non-being because the former, unlike the latter, 
can produce value. Also, this ability has value in itself. Therefore, starting from the idea that being 
has and produces value, the human being has the task of pursuing being rather than non-being. Given 
this basic ethical duty (acting so that being and its related value may continue to exists) and given 
Jonas’ analysis (focused on the knowledge-power relation and man’s potential inability to control his 
own power) it is indispensable that precautions are taken to defuse this mechanism from a political 
point of view. 
 
Therefore, Jonas uses ethics as the theoretical foundation of politics. In this sense, ethics is not 
focused on virtue - that is, the idea of individual self-perfecting - but on the concept of responsibility: 
in addition to being virtuous, following moral perfecting, humans (and especially those in power) 
must be responsible for the long-term consequences of their actions (Jonas 1979, Eng. tr. 123-125). 
This point shows particularly well how, for Jonas, responsibility comes before virtue, especially in 
cases of conflict. Responsibility concerns single individuals in their daily activities but mostly 
institutions and organizations managing power. Therefore, responsibility mainly concerns the State, 
which for Jonas is the institution that should work the most to protect being, living species and their 
future existence.  
 
In this sense, not all forms of government are equal since, for Jonas, it is utopian to think that the 
democratic system is able to defuse the utopian drive of Western societies. What, conversely, should 
be pursued, for Jonas, is a real policy of deflation: the reduction of utopian impulses for the benefit 
of the management and conservation of the existing. The idea, in essence, is that if more knowledge 
and more power can lead to the destruction of our world, the best option - as the most advantageous 
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in the long term - is that the State acts to control the utopian impulses and the knowledge related to 





3. In the name of responsibility: from ethics to ontology 
 
The feeling underlying Jonas' refoundation of ethics is certainly an important factor, which has 
become even more central in the light of the progressive globalization of contemporary societies, 
including non-Western ones.4 In other words, it is certainly true that the “vertical” dimension, 
focusing on virtue and individual behavior, as already noticed by Jonas (1979, Eng. tr. 125-127), must 
be suitably replaced by a horizontal dimension of attention to the whole spectrum of the consequences 
of human actions. This point is crucial. However, unlike Jonas, I believe that this renewed attention 
to responsibility, rather than an ethical choice made on a predictive basis, is due to an objective fact 
that characterizes the very structure of our social actions. This fact, as a given, has to do primarily 
with ontology, and only concerns ethics at a secondary level. Today, forty years later, we are better 
able to directly observe a reality that Jonas could only glimpse into. That is, we can observe how the 
relationship between generations is not marked by the increase of material and immaterial resources, 
as was believed with good reason by philosophers like Kant (Kant 2012). Rather, it is affected by the 
overall purpose of human practices: the achievement of the greatest possible benefit in a given 
historical moment.   
 
The theoretically relevant question concerns the fact that the unsustainability of this situation - which 
causes serious problems in the application of basic principles of justice - would require a revision of 
the concept of social action, which specifically pertains to social ontology. Only in a second phase 
may this revision be effectively transferred to the level of ethics and political philosophy. In this 
sense, it must certainly be recognized that the problem raised by Jonas regarding the inadequacy of a 
vertical ethics, not concerned with the dimension of time, is the same that interests many of the most 
important contemporary social ontologies. 
 
In fact, typically, analyses in social ontology clearly prefer to observe and study a society or a social 
model at a time t, rather than looking at the same society or social model through time. On the other 
hand, one of the elements that seem to characterize any social structure is its ability to persist in time. 
In other words, the main mechanisms of constitution, regulation and functioning of a given social 
structure at a given time are rather clear,5 whereas its (far from obvious) disposition to last over time, 
despite completely changing some of its constitutive elements (especially the people that make it up) 
is yet to be clarified. How does this work? 
 
The first and perhaps most immediate answer, supported by philosophers such as John Searle and 
Lionel Hart, stresses the importance of normativity (thus the practices, rules and legal devices that 
form the backbone of the social world), as well as of the institutions governing social reality. 
Although these elements are undoubtedly necessary to ensure the durability of a social structure, I do 
not think that they are also sufficient conditions. Before and beyond all institutional arrangements 
                                                 
4 On these issues cf. (Bailey Saki 2013). 
5 Cf. on this matter (Gilbert 1996, 2006), (Hart 1994), (Searle 1995, 2010), (Tuomela 1984, 2000, 2007, 2013). 
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and regulatory apparatuses, there is an important element that guarantees their durability and, 
therefore, the transgenerational passage that is rightly at the center of Jonas' theoretical and practical 
concerns. This element is related to the very structure of social actions. 
 
 
3.1.1. The other side of predictions: transgenerational actions  
 
Unlike Jonas, I do not believe that a prediction-based discourse is what should lead us to include the 
question of temporality - i.e. of extension in time - in our social ontology. Also, again unlike Jonas, I 
don’t think that the best solution to the problem of inter-generational relationships lies in the adoption 
of deflationary policies against the legitimate aspirations to a better life. Let me start with the first 
point that, in the sphere of social ontology, is certainly the most relevant. I have noted that Jonas 
makes two moves: first, he gives wide theoretical credibility to human predictive skills. Then, he 
makes a further theoretical assumption that, upon closer inspection, appears rooted in the tendency - 
common to many philosophers - to elaborate complex architectures of the future that go under the 
name of philosophies of history.  
 
In a word: the analysis of the present leads Jonas to foresee the approaching end of the life of humans 
and non-human animals on account of the consequences of human behavior. Jonas' idea is that if this 
hypothesis is even only possible, our task should be to address it at a theoretical and practical level, 
because the transition from the level of prediction to that of reality is something that, for Jonas, is 
founded on necessity. In this sense, the one described by Jonas resembles in many ways a philosophy 
of history in disguise, that is, a philosophical assumption about the future in which the level of 
prediction is treated as that of reality. How all of this is problematic at a methodological level was 
noted by Arthur Danto in a fundamental work dealing with the conditions of possibility of any 
philosophy of history (Danto 1965). Danto claims with good arguments that philosophy of history as 
a scientific discipline is as such implausible, because it is impossible to give it any scientific 
foundation. 
 
If prediction, as I was saying, cannot be relied upon because its outcomes can never produce a given, 
conversely, a reflection founded in ontology can proceed with greater certainty. In this sense it may 
be useful to examine a particular class of actions that - together with, and perhaps more than, others 
- play a fundamental role in the conservation of a social structure in time. I call them 
"transgenerational actions". The main characteristics of transgenerational actions are twofold: they 
provide temporality, i.e. a considerable extension in time as the property essential to their definition; 
furthermore, they are performed by different generations, that is, their implementation necessarily 
involves the intervention and cooperation between generations. 
 
Transgenerational actions allow societies to have a considerable - potentially infinite - time extension 
and, at the same time, imply the existence of a specific bond of dependence between the actors of this 
kind of actions. This bond is a crucial factor that must be included in our ontologies: without it, a 
society could not persist in time. Also, transgenerational actions are mainly performed by institutions 
(governments and states) and people acting on behalf of an institution. However it is not impossible 
that even individuals who do not act institutionally may perform transgenerational actions. Let me 




Suppose that Mr. X is the first minister of a medium-sized state. X is leading his country in a difficult 
time, in which a low rate of economic growth and a high public debt are accompanied by strong social 
tensions. The causes of the tensions are many, but in particular the most relevant are due to significant 
migration phenomena that are hard to regulate. X therefore has the hard task to maintain social 
consensus to keep the country together (and of course to be re-elected). So, he chooses to make 
decisions that increase public expenditure. This means increasing public debt, which will have to be 
paid by future generations. 
 
Mr X’s choice entails two relevant consequences: first, he decides to privilege the present over the 
future, that is, he decides that future generations will pay a higher public debt in the name of the 
stabilization of an uncertain political and social situation. Second, president X’s choice can indeed be 
implemented because all the agents at play - for instance, the banks managing the debt and the 
international agencies evaluating its sustainability - agree with Mr X that future generations will do 
what is expected of them and pay for the debt. This type of action that Mr X performs creates a very 
strong bond between different generations that is only stipulated by one, and yet is supposed to be 
respected by the other. In such a scenario, trust plays a fundamental role. The transgenerational action 
will therefore only be performed through the contribution of subjects other than those who have 
decided to make that action, and the social structure itself will not be jeopardized only if the 
transgenerational bond is respected.  
 
Let’s now make another example. Suppose Mr X is the prime minister of a developing country, one 
that belongs to the BRICS, as they are called in technical jargon. These states are governed through 
different political systems, and Mr X’s country is a parliamentary democracy. Given the very complex 
and competitive context, obviously emerging countries have to make hard choices that, in the 
immediate future, might be extremely costly. This is the case for decisions in matter of energy 
policies, with regards to which the alternative is: either invest in renewable energies or focus on 
traditional systems of energy production, based on the exploitation of nonrenewable natural 
resources.  So, the government asks the parliament to indicate which direction the country should 
follow. What’s at stake - as is obvious - is a radically different future: either go for the country’s 
immediate and fast development, increasing overall wealth, or proceed more slowly, investing on 
scientific research while preserving the country’s natural resources.  This second option will 
strengthen transgenerational bonds, in that it will testify to the awareness with which the decision has 
been made at a given historical moment, thereby making transgenerational trust possible.  
 
Contrary to what Jonas claims, the second option is not deflationary - which means that choosing 
sustainable alternatives to favour a more solid development in the long run doesn’t mean choosing to 
worsen the quality of life or give up the pursuit of progress. If anything, the opposite is true: only 
advanced scientific and technological research can replace the exploitation of natural resources. 
Therefore the best option doesn’t seem to be - as Jonas suggests - not to act so as not to strengthen 
the knowledge/power pair, but rather to act in a non conventional way, by means of a fairer covenant 
with future generations.  
 
The fact that such choices are indeed possible is proven by the government of Norway. The 
Government Petroleum Fund was instituted by the Norwegian government in 1990, and was aimed 
to invest the profits coming from petroleum - a nonrenewable natural resource. In 2006 the fund was 
renamed as Government Pension Fund – Global: it is a fund in Norwegian crowns managed, under 
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delegation by the Ministry of Finance, by the bank of Norway with the aim to ensure that “ future 
generations will also benefit from the value of the petroleum wealth being extracted.”6  
 
Why has the Norwegian government chosen to act this way? For very simple reasons: because the 
same government had previously decided to exploit common resources, where “common” doesn’t 
mean only “belonging to Norwegian citizens at a time t” but has the wider sense of “belonging to 
Norwegian citizens from t to infinite”. Given that oil is non-renewable, future Norwegian citizens 
wouldn’t have been able to benefit from the Petroleum Fund, despite the fact that they are virtually 
entitled to. Therefore, to strengthen the transgenerational bond, the government has chosen to give 
tangible proof that future Norwegians will not only receive requests and demands from their 
predecessors. The parliament, the government and the citizens represented in that government have 
chosen to enter a covenant in which the trust between generations is actually advantageous and 
credible. 
 
Let’s now try to envision a third scenario, in which Mr X is a wealthy art collector. In fact, he loves 
owning a masterpiece and taking it away from the public - part of the pleasure he gets comes from 
the idea that only he will be able to see that artwork, and nobody else. So, Mr X often buys works 
stolen from museums or other collectors. Acting this way, not only is he engaging in illegal activities 
by buying works that are not on the market, but he is also privileging the individual sphere over the 
transgenerational. That is, he privileges the aesthetic-contemplative sphere over the cultural and 
public one. Art is traditionally considered a vehicle of the collective identity that nations preserve 
through the generations. An artwork is the outcome of a particular sensibility, a mindset, a cultural 
context and the stratification of the interpretations of those who have encountered it.  
 
From this point of view, an artwork has extraordinary value. When Mr X takes it away from the 
public he chooses to interfere with the preservation of collective identity, which is a necessary 
condition to preserve any society over time. What Mr X is doing is disregarding the most classic 
transgenerational action: that is, the preservation of collective identity through cultural memory. In 
this case, which can be described as a failed transgenerational action, the element of trust is less 
relevant, because future generations aren’t required any other commitment compared to the current 
generation. 
 
As I hope to have shown through the above examples, transgenerational actions fully belong to the 
taxonomy of social actions. When they are brought into being - that is, when they meet the conditions 
that identify them - they also entail precise bonds with a fictional collective subject we call “future 
generations”. In the context of transgenerational actions, future generations are, to all intents and 








                                                 
6 Ethical Guidelines for the Government Pension Fund – Global, 22 December 2005, in 
https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/FIN/Vedlegg/aff/evaluation_ethical_Guidelines.pdf, p. 4. 
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